The mitigation role of collaterals and guarantees under Basel II by DE LISA Riccardo et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report EUR 25529 EN 
20 12  
Riccardo De Lisa 
Clara Galliani 
Massimo Marchesi 
Francesco Vallascas 
Stefano Zedda 
 
 
 
 
The mitigation role of collaterals and 
guarantees under Basel II 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
Joint Research Centre 
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
 
Contact information 
Stefano Zedda 
Address: University of Cagliari, Viale S. Ignazio, 74 09123 Cagliari IT 
E-mail: stefano.zedda@jrc.ec.europa.eu, szedda@unica.it 
Tel.: +39 070 6753418 
Fax: +39 070 668882 
 
http://ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
http://www.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
 
Legal Notice 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission 
is responsible for the use which might be made of this publication. 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu/. 
 
JRC75391 
 
EUR 25529 EN 
 
ISBN 978-92-79-26566-2 
 
ISSN 1831-9424 
 
doi:10.2788/50944 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 
 
© European Union, 2012 
 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
 
Printed in Italy 
 3 
Authors’ affiliation 
 
Riccardo De Lisa 
University of Cagliari, Department of Business and Economics 
Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi 
 
Clara Galliani 
European Commission Joint Research Centre, IPSC, Scientific Support to Financial Analysis Unit 
 
Massimo Marchesi 
European Commission, General Directorate Internal Market and Services 
 
Francesco Vallascas 
University of Leeds 
 
Stefano Zedda 
European Commission Joint Research Centre, IPSC, Scientific Support to Financial Analysis Unit  
University of Cagliari, Department of Business and Economics 
 
 4 
 
 5 
Abstract 
 
Under the Basel II framework for capital adequacy of banks, regulatory financial collateral and 
guarantees (C&G ) can affect lending policy in both a micro and a macro perspective.  
This paper aims at assessing these effects throught the modelling of the impact of C&G on credit 
spreads. In doing this we assume the perspective of a bank adopting a Foundation Internal Rating 
Based approach to measure credit risk and we apply a comparative-static analysis to a pricing model, 
based on the intrinsic value pricing approach as in the loan arbitrage-free pricing model (LAFP) 
suggested by Dermine (1996).  
Our results show that financial collaterals are more effective than guarantees in reducing credit 
spreads, this differential impact becoming greater as the borrower’s rating worsen.  
Moreover, the effects of C&G on credit spreads can be more effective than an improvement of 
borrower’s rating, this possibly leading to negative outfits on credit industries’ allocative efficiency.  
 
Keywords: Loans pricing, credit spreads, collaterals and guarantees, credit risk mitigation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Basel II framework for capital adequacy of banks, proposed by the Basel Comittee in June 2004 
and adopted by the EU in 2005, has strongly modified the methodology to compute capital 
requirements for credit institutions.  
In its prescription of a risk-sensitive measure of capital adequacy, the Basel II framework fully 
recognizes the role of collaterals and guarantees (C&G) as “mitigation” tools of the loan overall credit 
risk. Specifically, regulation prescribes that both the expected and unexpcted loss related to a given 
credit exposure, as defined for regulatory purposes, can be reduced to some extent if the loan is 
protected by eligible C&G. This might have some implications of both micro and macro nature. 
Under a micro perspective, if we assume a bank’s pricing criteria is based upon the evaluations of 
credit risk components, C&G become a sort of “regulatory driver” that can be used both by lenders and 
borrowers in the credit relationship, especially in the negotiation process of credit spreads. In other 
words, banks could differentiate credit spreads not only according to the rating assigned to borrowers, 
but also taking into account the regulatory effect on credit risk components, due to the release of either 
collaterals or guarantees.  
From a macro point of view, the new regulatory framework could have implications on the overall 
allocative efficiency of the credit industry. The banking system acts both as a mobiliser of savings and 
as a credit allocator for investment and production. The effectiveness of banking sector’s contribution 
to the economic growth and develpment is broadly determined by its efficiency in the allocation of 
mobilized savings amongst the more convenient projects (see Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; 
Levine, 1997). In this context, banking regulation should be aimed at allocative efficiency, in order to 
maximise economic growth. 
Given these implications, it can be important to verify “how” and “how much” the C&G impact on 
credit spreads.  
This paper aims at providing a quantitative assessment of these effects of C&G by assuming the 
perspective of a bank adopting an Internal Rating Based approach (IRB foundation) to measure credit 
risk and through a comparative-static analysis applied to a pricing model. The model is defined 
following the intrinsic value pricing approach, as in the loan arbitrage-free pricing model (LAFP) 
suggested by Dermine (1996), further developed for considering the regulatory treatment of financial 
collaterals and guarantees, and verify if credit exposure mitigation behaviours are relatively more 
convenient (in terms of credit spreads) than upgrading borrower’s rating quality, as such a regulation 
would result in a loose of efficiency in the credit allocation. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the regulatory treatment of C&G under IRB 
foundation approach as indicated in the Capital Requirement Directive. Section 3 after a general 
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comment about the effects of C&G on loan pricing, describes the methodology we adopt to assess the 
C&G impact on credit spreads. Sction 4 reports the main results, and section5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The treatment of collaterals and guarantees under the IRB approach 
 
A whole annex of the Directive on capital adequacy is devoted to credit risk mitigation instruments, 
defined as on-balance sheet netting, collateral, guarantees and credit derivatives. The new regulatory 
framework defines with great details both the requirements that these risk mitigation instruments have 
to satisfy in order to be recognised by the supervisors and the quantitive methodology to assess their 
impact on expected and unxecpeted loss1.  
Focusing on collaterals and guarantees, it is worth mentioning that the Directive treats these credit risk 
mitigation instruments in a more extensive manner with respect to the 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I).  
In other words, conversely to the previous regulation, the Directive not only expands the list of 
collaterals and guarantees eligible within the banking supervision context, but also modifies the 
methodology for computing their impact on credit risk. 
In the rest of this paper we refer to banks measuring credit spreads trough the IRB approach 
(foundation), and we only consider the regulatory treatment of both financial collaterals and guarantees 
as described by the Capital Adequacy Directive only for this credit risk method. 
 
1. Collaterals  
The impact of financial collaterals on credit risk components (expected and unexpected loss) is 
measured by the so called “comprehensive method”. Under this method the Market Value of the 
Collateral2 (MVC) is applied by the bank to modify the value of the regulatory Loss Given Default 
(LGD) as follows: the regulatory value of the LGD suggested by the supervisors (45% for senior 
exposures; 75% for subordinated exposures) is multiplied by a corrective factor obtained as the ratio of 
the adjusted value of the exposure (E - MVC) to its current value (E). Formally speaking the LGD to 
be used for computing the capital requirement and the expected loss for an exposure assisted by a 
financial collateral is then the following: 
* 0
E MVC
LGD LGD MVC E
E
 
    
 
 
                                                 
1 The eligible conditions and the minimum requirements for collaterals and guarantees described in the Directive are not analysed in this 
paper. In fact the analysis of these requirements would require an extensive description, outside the purpose of this work. Obviously, we 
assume in the following sections that collaterals and guarantees obtained by the bank respect all the eligible conditions and the minimum 
requirements expected by the Directive. For a complete analysis of these requirements see the Directive, Annex VIII, part 1 and part 2, 
pp.1-38. 
2 The bank must adjust the market value of the collateral to take into account its volatility and any maturity mismatch with the exposure. 
For a description of the comprehensive method, see Directive, Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 1.4, points 31-62, pp. 51-66. 
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As specified above, the market value of the collateral must be positive and lower than the exposure. If 
its value is either equal to or greater than the value of the exposure, the benefit for the lender is the 
reset of the LGD. 
 
2. Guarantees 
Under the IRB foundation approach, if an exposure can benefit from a guarantee, it can be 
decomposed into two parts for the computation of both the expected loss and the capital requirement to 
cover unexpected losses.  
In particular the expected loss is measured as a weighted average of the one assigned to an exposure 
toward the guarantor and the one for an exposure toward the borrower. The weight for the first 
component is defined on the basis of the coverage degree ensured by the guarantor, the weight for the 
second component reflecting the percentage of the loan without any credit protection.  
As regards the capital requirement, the risk weight coefficient for the first component is computed on 
the basis of the level of risk assigned to the guarantor in terms of Probability to Defult (PD) and using 
its own risk function, while the amount of the credit exposure not covered by the guarantee is 
computed applying the borrower’s PD. Therefore, a guarantee is only effective if the guarantor PD is 
lower than the debtor’s one. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The loan spread function 
The literature on pricing banking loans identifies two main, not necessarily alternative, behavioural 
models for financial institutions3.  
According to the first approach, a bank defines the loan pricing in order to be strictly conformed to the 
pricing conditions applied in the credit market. This model is called comparison pricing, since the 
pricing determinants are derived from the prices applied by other intermediaries on loans with similar 
features for both risk and maturity. 
The second model does not adopt a market perspective, but focuses on the “intrinsic components” of 
pricing (intrinsic value pricing). Under this approach, banks adopt a production criteria in defining the 
pricing, so that the loan pricing is firstly affected by the exposure level of risk (in particular credit risk) 
and then by the other cost components deriving from the same exposure. As a result it is possible to 
                                                 
3 On loan pricing see, amongst others,: J.B. Caouette, E.I. Altman, P. Narayanan, (1998), J. Dermine (1996, 2003); M.B Gordy 
(2003); F. Saita (2003). 
 10 
identify a risk adjusted return proxy of the loan pricing as, the proper return on lending, on the base of 
its risk and the other costs to be supported by the financial intermediary. 
In this second typology pricing models linked to RORAC (return on risk-adjusted capital) criteria are 
also classified. In these models the expected net return on the exposure (measured on own funds 
covering the unexpected loss) is at least equal to the ROE target that management want to ensure to 
shareholders. 
Within the intrinsic value pricing category are also included models such as LAFP (loan arbitrage-free 
pricing model). This model, also following the criteria based on the comparison between ROE target 
and return on the loan, takes into account the time value of the money regarding the cashflows related 
to the credit exposure.  
The pricing is therefore derived through the identity between the future values of the cashflow in and 
that of the cashflow out.  
Considering the credit risk related to the exposure, namely the probability that the debtor is not able to 
repay the credit at maturity, we can have that: 
1. the debtor defaults (with probability PD); 
2. the debtor regularly pays the credit (with probability 1-PD) 
Considering as a standard reference a unitary credit, with one year maturity, and interests paid at the 
end of the period, the expected value of the exposure j can be obtained as: 
(1)           jjjjj PDLGDiPDiME  1111  
where : 
 ME   is the expected value of the credit at the end of the period; 
ji  is the interest rate applied on the j risky loan; 
jPD   is the probability of default of the j debtor; 
jLGD  is the probability to default of the j debtor; 
Secondly, the price of a loan should be adequate with respect to all the cashflows coming from the 
credit exposure. These cashflows regard the funding needs and the operative costs for the screening 
and monitoring the credit risk of the borrower.  
Formally, we have: 
(2)         jejdj coprCiCMU  111  
where: 
U (M) is the overall cash flows out; 
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Cj is the equity funding (%); 
di  is the interest rate paid on interbank funding; 
er  is the gross return to shareholders; 
jcop  is the operative costs related to the loan; 
By jointly considering (1) e (2) we can get the break-even price of the loan: 
(3)               jejdjjjjjj coprCiCPDLGDiPDi  1111111  
solving for ji : 
(4) 
 
jj
jdejjjd
j
LGDPD
copirCLGDPDi
i



1  
Where Cj is the regulatory capital, computed as in the Directive4: 
    
 
 
 
      
0,5
0,5
1 1
1
1 0,999
1
1 1,5 1 2,5 1,06
j
j j j j j j
j
j j j
R PD
C LGD N R PD N PD N PD LGD
R PD
B PD M B PD

 

   
          
   
    
        
 
 
where: 
N is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable; 
N
-1
 is the inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable; 
B(PD) is a correction factor for the maturity adjustment, computed as follows: 
   
2
0.11852 0.05478lnj jB PD PD     
Mj is the effective maturity; 
R(PDj) is the correlation parameter between assets, computed as follows: 
         
 
0,12 1 50 / 1 50 0,24 1 1 50 / 1 50
0,04 1 5 / 45
j j
j
R EXP PD EXP EXP PD EXP
S
                      
    
 
where:  
Sj = Sales;  5 50jS   
Subtracting from both members of (1) the cost of interbank funding, we obtain: 
                                                 
4 The capital requirements formula showed in the text can be used for pricing loans released to firms with total sales equal o greater than 
€ 50 Mln. For firms with total sales lower than € 50 Mln. this formula must be adjusted to achieve a lower capital requirement for the 
same probability of default of the borrower. See Directive, Annex VII, part 1, par. 1.1, p. 28-29.  
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(5.1) 
 
jj
jjddjdejjjd
dj
LGDPD
LGDPDiicopirCLGDPDi
iiSpread



1  
That can also be written as: 
(5.2) 
   
jj
jdejdjj
dj
LGDPD
copirCiLGDPD
iiSpread



1
1
 
Which can also be represented as the sum of three components: 
1. the expected loss component, namely the percentage of the loan that the bank estimates to loose on 
average; 
2. the unexpected loss component; 
3. the operative cost component.  
 
(5.3) 
   
jj
j
jj
dej
jj
djj
dj
LGDPD
cop
LGDPD
irC
LGDPD
iLGDPD
iiSpread








111
1
 
Expected loss component 
Unexpected loss component 
        Operative cost component 
 
3.2 The impact of collaterals and guarantees on pricing function 
 
Collaterals and guarantees impact on credit spreads through their effects both on the expected loss and 
on the capital requirement, due for covering unexpected loss. In addition, the magnitudo of these 
effects depends on the type of C&G released to the banks and the level of coverage of the exposure 
ensured by the credit risk mitigation instruments. 
We can analyse these aspects for a bank using an IRB foundation approach measuring credit spreads 
according to the function 5.3: 
Under a regulatory perspective, G&C mainly affect the first two components of the spread function5. 
Considering the case of a loan with a recognised financial collateral, we find two effects on credit 
spread (see figure 1): the direct one (labelled as “A” in Fig. 1) is on jLGD , while the second (B) 
indirectly results from the effect on jC , the capital requirement ratio, of the change in jLGD . 
                                                 
5 From the regulatory point of view, we can assume that C&G do not impact on the organisational component, even though the mitigation 
instrument evaluation will impact on the operative costs of the credit relationship.  
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The overall effect results in an increasing function of the degree of protection ensured by the collateral. 
For example, in the extreme case of a 100% loan coverage by an eligible financial collateral, both 
jLGD  and jC  go to zero, and the resulting loan spread is equal to operative costs. 
 
Fig. 1- Impacts of collaterals on pricing function  
 
 
 
 
(1) 
   
jj
j
jj
dej
jj
djj
LGDPD
cop
LGDPD
irC
LGDPD
iLGDPD
Spread








111
1
 
 
 
 
 
For an intermediate degree of coverage ensured by the collateral, we have a decrease in both the 
expected and unexpected component of credit spread with respect to a loan without any mitigation 
instrument.  
Conversely to the case of collateral, the impact of eligible guarantees on the spread function does not 
affect the LGD, but its effect is on the probability of default of the exposure.  
More specifically, the PD to be considered is a weighted average of the borrower PD ( jPD ), and the 
guarantor PD ( gPD ) which is supposed to be lower than jPD . Formally we have: 
 * 1j j gPD PD PD        1 0   
The effects on credit spread due to these changes are summarised in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2- Impacts of guarantees on pricing function  
 
 
 
 
(1) 
   
jj
j
jj
dej
jj
djj
LGDPD
cop
LGDPD
irC
LGDPD
iLGDPD
Spread








111
1
 
 
 
 
 
Also in this case we have two effects on credit spread (see Fig. 2): the direct one (A) is on jPD , while 
the second (B) indirectly results from the effect on jC , the capital requirement ratio, of the change in 
jPD . 
 A 
 B 
 A 
 B 
 14 
It is worth mentioning that the loan spread price reaches the minimum level (equal to the operative 
costs, as in the case of a collateral) only when there is a full protection ensured by a guarantor with 
zero risk weight, such as a central bank or similar. 
An equal effect can not be produced by all the other typologies of guarantors recognised by the 
directive (i.e. banks or other financial institution), since their PD has a minimum regulatory value fixed 
to 0,03%.  
 
3.3 The pricing model 
 
What is described in the previuos paragraph can be formally described by the set of four equations 
listed below:  
(6.1)  
   
****
*
**
**
111
1
jj
j
jj
dej
jj
djj
LGDPD
cop
LGDPD
irC
LGDPD
iLGDPD
Spread








 
(6.2)    GDJ PDPDPD  1
*
   1 0   
(6.3)  




 

E
MVCE
MAXLGDJ %45;0
*
;  %450
*  LGD   0E MVC   
(6.4) 
           06,15,215,11999,0
1
1
1*
5,0
5,0** 


























bMbLGDPDG
R
R
PDGRNLGDC j  
where: 
jPD  is the probability of default of the borrower 
gPD  is the probability of default of the garantor 
Equation (6.1) represents the pricing function already presented; (6.2) is the PDs weighted average for 
considering the guarantees; (6.3) refers to the adjustement of LGD for the presence of collaterals; (6.4) 
represents the regulatory capital for covering the unexpected loss. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
The pricing model results are evaluated in terms of comparative-static analysis, on the base of its 
elasticies. 
Figure 3 shows the pricing function given a regulatory 45% LGD. The spread function is an increasing 
function of PD with a decreasing slope, as shown by the first order derivative analysis plot (Fig. 4). 
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Fig  3 – The pricing function (given a LGD=45%) 
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Fig. 4 – First order derivative of the pricing function with respect to PD (given a LGD=45%) 
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Pd
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
D spread to Pdd
 
 
Extending the analysis to the determinants of credit spreads, we see that in cases of low PDs the 
organizational component plays the major role. The expected loss shows the highest weights when the 
PDs are very high (Fig. 5), reducing the role of unexpected losses.  
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Fig. 5 – The pricing function: weights of components 
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In order to investigate the sensitivity of the loan spread price to the components, we computed the 
elastisties with respect to PD and LGD. The elasticities plots are reported in Fig.6. 
The graph shows that the loan spread is more elastic with respect to LGD than PD. As an exemple, for 
a PD of 1,4%, the spread elasticity with respect to LGD is equal to 0,33; with respect to PD is equal to 
0,22 (lgd/pd =1,5). Moreover, the point elasticities increase as borrower’s PD increases. 
Fig. 6 – Elasticities of credit spread with respect to PD and LGD  
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
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Spread elasticity to Pdd lgd
 
εspread, LGD 
εspread, PD 
ε 
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The relative major importance of the LGD factor in affecting the price can also be seen trough the 
elasticities of C (regulatory capital) spread component  with respect to LGD and PD (Fig. 7). In the 
graph, the elasticities of the credit spread with respect to LGD is constantly higher than the PD one. 
Fig. 7– Elasticities of capital requirement with respect to LGD and PD 
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1
 
The last point of the analysis is devoted to the investigation of the relative importance of financial 
collaterals and guarantees in affecting credit spreads. In this aim, we compared the elasticities of the 
loans spread for a given borrower PD with respect to the market value of financial collateral, MVC, 
and with respect to the coverage degree, .  
Fig. 8 plots the spread elasticities in case of different values of MVC and , with a guarantor PD of 
0,45%, and a borrower PD of 1,4%. 
Fig. 8 – Elasticities of credit spread with respect to MVC and α (given a borrower’s PD of 0,45%) 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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 18 
As can be seen from Fig. 8, the credit spread is more affected by MVC than , this implying that, for a 
given value of coverage degree, the financial collateral is stronger than a guarantte in determining 
price decreases. More, the differential “strenght” of the financial collateral increases as the coverage 
degree increases. 
Conversely, the credit spread elasticity with respect to α decreases as the guarantor’s rating quality 
decreases. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Under the Basel II capital adequacy framework collaterals and guarantees play a relevant role in the 
determining credit pricing, as their presence reduces the overall credit risk for a given loan. 
The comparative-static analysis presented in this paper aims at investigating the sensitivity of credit 
spreads to C&G, under the new European regulatory framework. To do so, we adopted a loan pricing 
function derived from the intrinsic loan pricing literature (LAFP - loan arbitrage-free pricing model), 
adjusted for capturing the regulatory treatment of financial collaterals and guarantees. 
Our results show that financial collaterals are stronger than guarantees in lowering the credit spread for 
a given loan, and even if it is more evident when borrower’s PD is at the highest level, this holds also 
in those cases where the borrower’s PD is very low.  
In general, credit spreads are more elastic to C&G than to borrower’s rating improvements. 
Given this last result, borrowers’ choices towards the release of credit risk mitigation tools seem to be 
more appealing than corporate strategies aiming at upgrading borrower’s rating quality. If this can be 
efficient for the banking point of view, the same do not holds with respect to the whole economic 
system, as the cosequences of a default are not covered by the same kind of instruments. 
Under this perspective, a credit credit allocation policy based on this role of C&G could lead to a 
decrease in the allocative efficiency of credit industry and a less contributing to the overall economic 
growth. 
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